The Post-Arab Spring Terrorism Causes: State Failure and Oil Endowment

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Amel Hammami[1] , Monya Idoudi[2]

Introduction:

By the end of 2010 a large wave of street protests in Tunisia overthrew decades of economic malaise, political oppression and social discontent. The Tunisian events evolved into contagious revolutionary movements in the Middle East and North Africa called “the Arab Spring”. The Arab Spring revolutions concentrated in five countries, it lead to regime’s toppling in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and produced a civil war in Syria. It also spread and pivoted political riots and loud reforms appeals in Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The popular upheavals coincided with the increase of terrorism incidents in the five most affected countries of the Arab Spring. These countries experienced terrorism for several years and in various frequencies before 2010[3], but they had not experienced the same severity and rate of attacks.

The up growth of terrorist activities illustrated by the alteration of the ranks and scores of the Arab Spring countries coded in the Global Terrorism Index of 2014. Syria is among the first five countries most impacted by terrorism, Yemen is between the most 10 countries experiencing terrorism between 2012 and 2014, Libya and Egypt are ranked on the group of 15 countries with the highest levels of terrorist activities in 2013 and Tunisia became part of the top 50 countries most infected by terrorism. Previous studies (Donald Holbrook 2012, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Tara Vassefi 2015) returned this increase to the State failure resulted by the antigovernment protests that had weakened or anesthetized the State capacities. But, the State Failure could not be the only explanation behind terrorism explosion after 2010; it must connect and react with other variables. This hypothesis appeared on the surface because not all failed states are equally disposed to terrorism, some failings are more likely to generate conditions conducive to terror than others.[4]On the Arab Spring ground, the evolution of terroristic events synchronized with a State failure, but it was recorded in different scales in various countries; it occurred mostly in Syria, Yemen and Libya. The most innovation of terrorist groups and the highest growth of terrorist attacks took place in approximation of the Gas and Oil fields. The second motivational factor for the rise of terrorism after 2010 is the Natural Resources endowment. For, the common characteristic between Syria; Libya and Yemen against Tunisia along with Egypt is the size of the natural fortune. Thus, does the State Failure along with the wealth of Natural Resources back the post-Arab Spring terrorism increase?

This paper is part of a research line interested in following up the relationship between the Arab Spring and terrorism and the mutual influence between them (AlexS. Wilner 2011, Donald Holbrook 2012, Richard J. Chasdi 2013, Michael Beker 2015, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Tara Vassefi 2015).Indeed, and thanks to the timing of this paper, five years after the revolution, which gave us access to determine the real characteristics of the Arab Spring, address its impact and interpret its relation with terrorism. In short we can test whether these characteristics are effectively causing the evolution of terrorism or not.

The importance of this research is attached to the sudden rise, fastened pace and widespread evolution of the phenomenon of terrorism after a democratic upheaval. This provocative phenomenon needs a deep research in order to identify its causes and to uncover the incentives that Arab Spring provides for terrorism to achieve this growth, and to decode how terrorist groups take advantage from the chaos caused by protests during the Arab Spring to maximize its benefits. The underlying aim of this research is to examine the broad relationships between State failure and Oil wealth on the one hand and terrorism on the other hand, to determine the causes of terrorism evolution after the Arab upheaval. This paper undertakes a more precise analysis of the relationship between the State failure and terrorism because it introduces a new motivational factor, the Natural Resources.

Most previous literature on causes of terrorism focuses on the perpetrator level (Abrahms 2004; Bloom 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Chenoweth 2010; Horowitz 2010; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003), while this study concentrates on the motivational factors on the country level. Furthermore, this paper highlights the political context of terrorism in the Arab spring which was neglected in the earlier studies about terrorism.

This paper is a tentative to address this question: does the reaction between the State failure and Oil resources generate terrorism growth after the Arab Spring? The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides the literature review on the Arab-Spring and terrorism; the third section focuses on the hypothesis of the Post-Arab Spring terrorism causes, section 4 elaborates the data and methodological issues; section 5 displays the empirical results and the last section concludes.

II- The Post-Arab Spring Terrorism in the Literature:

After 2011, “the Arab Spring” as a concept invaded the international image and received attention of politicians, journalists, artists, economists, jurists and academics. Several scholars focused on terrorism as a simultaneous reaction with this phenomenon(Wilner 2011;Lahoud 2011; Lilli 2011;Stern; Schweitzer 2011, Yazgan Etiz 2012; Holbrook 2012;Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012; Chasdi 2013; Keatinge 2014; Beker 2015; Anderson 2015).The plenty of studies hides the disagreement around the nature of this relation.

Some academics underlined the negative effects of Arab Spring on terrorism (Wilner 2011; Rayan 2011;Lahoud 2011; Lilli 2011; Holbrook 2012). They suggested that the popular uprising weakened Al-Qaeda, its branches and supporters in Africa and in the Middle East[5]. The peaceful popular events of the Arab Spring made terrorism “a less attractive (possibly, unnecessary) option”[6]. It pulled the carpet from under the violence appeals and ideologies of terrorist groups and provided a “striking counterexample to Al-Qaeda’s emphasis on violent regime change in the Middle East”[7].Wilner highlighted how Arab Spring revolutions achieved in weeks of peaceful protests which the terrorist groups in the region failed to accomplish using violence over several decades[8]. In addition, the success of peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt were a strong motivation for people in North Africa and the Middle East to protest against their dictator regimes. Moreover, the protesters adopted the slogans of democracy and highlighting a great sense of nationalism and patriotism[9]. They urged for the process of democratization in their countries. The democratic wishes of protesters were in the opposite direction of terrorism, they present an alternative form to express the popular discontent of political or economic or social grievances, based on peaceful means and acts. Consequently, the Arab Spring represents a “bad news for terrorists”[10] because it reduces the attraction of violent organizations and decreases the popularity of extremist ideologies, in sum; it dries up the terrorism recruitment targets. In fact, Rayan considers that, and in answer to the democratic revolutionary success, “a major part of the Arab world will have unfurled the banner of modernization and democracy”[11]. Other scholars such as Lahoud and Holbrook have the same opinion upon the depressing effects of the autocratic regimes toppling on the terrorism’s rhetoric. They agree that “the jihadist narrative enjoyed greater credibility under the autocratic regimes”[12]. According to Holbrook, the secular and democratic overthrow of the “apostate” dictatorships contrasted the terrorist claim about the secular regimes unpopularity “to promote alternative forms of governance based on its interpretation of Islamic Law”[13]. Nelly Lahoud embraced the same idea; he sees that the jihad against the secular regimes was a strong component of Al-Qaeda rhetoric[14], and explains that the biggest terrorist organization in the area lost this component with the Arab Spring. Furthermore, Lahoud considers that the Arab Spring enlarge Al-Qaeda’s loss because it absorbed the popular indignation and mitigated the public discontent associated with the political persecution before the removal of dictatorships. Which is confirmed through the thought that, it is comparing to the immediate international polemic that the Arab Spring created, the reactivity of terrorist groups to the Arab Spring events was weak and slow[15]. The first statement of Al-Qaeda regarding the revolutions took weeks after the Tunisian and Egyptian upheaval.

Others scholars such as Chasdi, Hopkings (2012) and Wilner, interpreted the following events of the revolutions as favorable conditions or as an opportunity of terrorism increase. This interpretation is enhanced by the terrorists’ claims and statements relating to the Arab Spring. The democratization process of previous dictatorships has taken years. The establishment of democratic institutions and the repair of the State-people relations take time. However, in the Arab Spring case, the time is a challenging issue for the post revolution rulers and for the revolution makers. If the rulers continue the policies of their toppled predecessor of neglect, humiliation and intimidation millions of the revolution makers and sympathizers “will remain unemployed, underutilized and undervalued, potentially easy prey for a resurgent Al-Qaeda”[16].

The statements released by the terrorist leaders support this line of thought; they exploited this opportunity of unclearness to include themselves in the Arab Spring events. They tried to annex the revolutionary events to their battle, and to subordinate the unexpected events to their old terrorist plans. Interestingly, is the tactical ideological reconciliation with the popular protests, while in the near past years the terrorist scholars has undervalued the population demonstrations and the civil power role[17]. Which is confirmed in their statement: “we confirm to all the Muslim people that we are their soldiers, and we will not spare any effort, Allah willing, to liberate them from the occupiers in Kashmir, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Palestine. And we support their blessed uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. We are fighting a single battle with them against America and its servants”.[18]Additionally, the terrorist leaders exposed the revolutions an Islamist plan wishing to topple “the apostate regimes allies of western countries”[19].The Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri addressed people of the Arab Spring countries “Your jihadi brethren,(…), are confronting alongside you the same enemy, America and its Western allies, those who set up …Husni Mubarak, Zein al-Abidin B. Ali, Ali Abdallah Salah, Abdallah B. Hussein and their ilk to rule over you”[20] . Osama Ben Laden, also, glorified the popular revolution and attempted to pivot it into his Jihadist battle, where he declared that the revolutions were an “opportunity for advancing the Ummah and becoming liberated from serving the whims of the rulers, manmade laws, and Western domination (…) The revolution was not one of food and clothing (…) but one of dignity and defiance, a revolution of sacrifice and giving”[21].

The literature on the relations between Arab Spring and terrorism is recent. It suffers of incoherence because it follows active and current phenomenon. This literature still focusing on this relation from outside, it explains this relation by external factors such as the death of Al-Qaeda head (Hoffman 2011, Wilner 2011), or the reactivity of international terrorism to the revolutions (Donald Holbrook 2012, DaveedGartenstein-Ross, Tara Vassefi 2015), or the sustainable terrorism financing[22] (Dean, Aimen, Edwina Thompson and Tom Keatinge, 2013). The main aim of these studies is the description of the mutual effects of the Arab Spring and terrorism and the interpretation of the results of this mutual relation. The obvious shortcoming is the use of uncounted explanatory variables to explain this relation, for example the Arab Spring, the death of Ben Laden or the media response of terrorist organizations still non-countable and non-verifiable causes of the Post-Arab Spring terrorism.

IV- Hypothesis on the Post-Arab Spring terrorism causes:

The common observation among all the Arab Spring countries is the intensification of terrorist activities. This up growth appeared in the alteration of the ranks and scores of the Arab Spring countries arranged in the Global Terrorism Index after the revolution (GTI), all these countries have become part of the top 50 countries ranked by the GTI of 2014[23].

The revolutionary events emerged an extreme political instability; weakened the State functions and confounded the institutions reaction, while the political stability is an initial pattern of preventing terrorism[24]. The terrorist groups seek similar circumstances of instability for moving easier and enhancing their capabilities. Consequently, the terrorist groups took advantage from the new and foggy atmosphere of freedom and from “the amount of Jihadist leaders who have escaped or have been released from prisons” during the Arab Spring events, to restructure themselves and re-establish the war against the State[25].This vacuum constituted an optimal situation for the terrorist groups to smuggle arms, and it was the perfect timing for the terrorist fighters to cross uncontrolled borders.

The main characteristic of the Arab Spring was the State weakness and failure which favored the emergence of an optimal atmosphere of terrorist activities. The protesters were enraged within the State institutions and considered them as an interface of the old regime. Equally important,was that the peaceful revolution such as the Tunisian and the Egyptian upheavals, or the open rebellion like the Libyan and Syrian cases, the Arab Spring harmfully affected the functioning of the State institutions and weakened their abilities. The weakness of the formal institutions gave the opportunity to other religious, political and social informal entities to fill the institutional vacuum(Wilner 2011, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi 2012, Holbrook 2012 ).This situation, was the best circumstance for the terrorist groups “to take advantage from the atmosphere of freedom to reorganize their ranks and restart their battles”[26]. Indeed, Wilner found that the direct results of the upheavals offered a logistical help to the terrorist networks, in other words “the removal of dictators and their apparatuses of control and subjugation have ushered in a period of lawlessness in some parts, which makes trafficking arms and moving fighters easier”[27]. Wilner refers to this terrorism peak as a result of the State failure and the vacuum that created “the removal of dictators and their apparatuses of control and subjugation”[28]. Also, Rice (2003) found that the terrorist threat is related to this lack of borders control[29].

On the ground reality, the revolutionary events of January 25, 2011 in Egypt led to the collapse of the Egyptian security system, which increased the security troubled in the fragile Sinai and affected the stability in all the territory. The terrorist groups have gained flexibility of mobility from the security vacuum; they have increased their activities and strengthened their military capabilities and numbers[30]. They have committed dozens of attacks on military targets, on commercial areas and on touristic sites during the last 4 years[31].In Tunisia, the forced resignation of a number of high officers in the Ministry of Interior and the dissolution of the State Security Apparatus after the revolution troubled the security system especially that a significant number of the resigned officers occupied the head of departments and agencies and enjoyed high professional competences[32]. In Libya, the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi “was a good in the sense that it stopped the massacre of innocent people, but what followed was a failed State that provided room for extremist groups to flourish”[33]. As an illustration, the post-Gaddafi Libyan governments lost control over important parts of the country areas for the count of armed groups.

During the events of the Arab Spring, many of the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni armies were weakened and disintegrated as they lost parts of their forces because of their sectarian or tribal composition. The division was heavy and had negative results. It weakened the state capability of borders control. As a result, it facilitated the entry of weapons and foreign fighters across the borders[34].

Furthermore, failed States represent “safe havens and incubators of transnational terrorism”[35] and the level of State failure determines the possibility that a State would experience terrorism[36]. In this perspective, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen today present the favorite place to localize and to operate for terrorist groups. The territories of these States “are anarchic conduits through which arms, drugs, money, and people can be trafficked without notice”[37].

For this reason, among the Arab Spring region, the “most failed” states, those that experience civil war or political collapse witnessed the biggest terrorism activities[38]. For instance, Syria, Yemen and Libya were the field of the largest number of terrorist activities in the region.

Hy 1: the State failure that synchronized with the Arab Spring causes terrorist incidents increase.

However, the state failure that the upheavals generated cannot be the only reason causing the Post-Arab Spring terrorism peak; we observe that terrorism increased in different speeds and levels in the different countries which highlight the emergence of other indicators. In terms of geographical location, and amongst the failed Arab spring states; the terrorist groups localized their bases and attacks in the areas with the highest Oil resources which are basically Libya, Yemen and Syria. In the same way, among the most failed states we find Angola, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Sudan that have Oil wealth. In addition, abundant resources can negatively affect the state’s fighting capacity, as argued, for example, by Fearon and Laitin (2003)[39].Thus, the Oil can be the researched second factor that reacts with the State failure and explains the increase of terrorist activities in the Arab Spring region.

The role of natural resources is particularly important to the analysis and the causes of the conflicts[40] and some scholars consider that resource dependency pivots conflict, because the control of natural resources provides a source for financing rebellions and terrorist plans[41]. Furthermore, Lujala (2009) found that Hydrocarbon production is associated with more intensive conflicts and that it multiples the number of battle-related deaths inside the conflict zone[42]. Moreover, the resource dependency is an important factor of State failure[43], and the Oil production is highly important for secessionist parties’ calculus[44]. Along the same lines, the rentier-state theory argues that resource-dependent States are likely to develop authoritarian regimes[45]. The same theory later argues that “authoritarian rentier-regimes are more fragile than they seem”[46], this fragility can make these states more open to terrorist attacks .

What makes Oil more attractive is its easiness of marketing, selling and smuggling due to the multitude of smuggling routes in the region. Oil provides for terrorist organizations constant source of financing and stable revenues. Equally, natural resources provide to the terrorist groups the financial requirements to increase their recruitment capacities, develop their weapons and materials, and to sustain fighter’s wages. In the same way, the resource profits can be a motivational factor for rebels to join the movement and increase the intensity of the fighting efforts[47].

In the Arab Spring context, Oil is an important factor to the progress of events. It is an influential element in the determination of the difference players, as it is one of the determinants of the conflict there. The oil wealth affects the war between the rebel group and the State by escalating the incentives of both of them[48]. Both, the governments and terrorist are racing to control petrol fields, especially the terrorist organizations who want to expand their activities, finance their operations and reconstruct themselves. Le Billon (2001) suggests that the natural resource abundance is an important factor in the conflicts in some African countries like Nigeria, Angola and Sierra Leone[49]. Additionally, the United Nations underlines the importance of Oil wealth in the capacities of terrorist groups after the Arab Spring[50], it identified the Islamic State-related funding streams, including revenues generated from control of Oil fields and related infrastructure. In this case, after it conquered most of the Oil fields in Syria and a number of production fields in Iraq in 2014, ‘the Islamic State’ established a black market to sell Oil and exchange its financing resources.

The trafficking of Oil is the basic funding to the “Islamic State”[51], in order to insure the evolution of its army’s capabilities[52]. Syria’s oil reserves were estimated by 2,500,000,000 barrel in May 2014[53], the Oil constituted 24.2% of GDP in 2006 and 21% of GDP in 2007[54]. Most of the Oil and Gas fields in Syria are localized in the north and the middle east of the country. Thus, the terrorist groups have tried to dominate these areas since their appearance in the Arab Spring and gain control over most of these fields[55]. Identically, Libya is one of the largest exporters of Oil, it had 4 % of the world crude oil reserves[56], and the Oil constituted 44.2 % of GDP in 2013[57]. After the events of the Arab Spring, Libya’s Oil has become a subject of conflict between the governments, the militias, the armed groups, and different terrorist organizations. In Libya, rebel groups tended to control the resource area for personal gain or to finance warfare during a conflict[58], since being wealthy is one of the most important measures of the strength and the influence of terrorist groups. Thus, Oil is so important for these groups in order to be able to finance their operations and improve their position in the political negotiations between the parties regarding the Libyan crisis[59].

In Yemen, the petrol is the main engine of the economy; it represents 30% of GDP[60]. During the situation of chaos and the air strikes of Saudi Arabia and its allies against Yemeni rebels, the armed groups occupied the Oil platform in the city of Shahr related to the Messila Oil field in Hadramaut. Balhaf Corporation for the production and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the south of Yemen was also controlled by Al-Qaeda organization in the Arabian Peninsula[61].

Nevertheless, the Oil wealth is not on itself a cause for terrorism. However, if it is to be combined with a situation of failure and if a State suffers from resource dependency, this wealth can motivate terrorists to commit more activities.

Hy 2: When the state failure combined with an Oil wealth generates terrorist incidents increase.

V- Methodological approach and Data description:

Econometric model

We estimated the impact of oil endowment and State fragility on the rise of terrorism using the following empirical model:

Yit= β0+ β1SFit+ β2 OILit+ β3Xit+ εit

Where Yit represents the level of terrorism of country I, at time t, SFit is the state fragility variable for country I, at time t, OILit is the oil endowment for country I, at time t, and Xit represents the matrix of control variables, while ԑit is the disturbance term. The model predicts that the rise of terrorism is affected positively by the state fragility and oil resources. The vector of control variables X includes: GDP per capita, population size, democracy, a dummy variable for Muslim countries and corruption. The choice of these explanatory variables is based on the previous literature.

Our second hypothesis:

  • State Fragility increases terrorism in the presence of oil resources.

In order to test this hypothesis, we modify our baseline model by introducing an interaction variable between “oil rent” and “state fragility” to see whether State Fragility affects terrorism when it is combined with the presence of oil resources.

We estimate the following model:

Yit= β0+ β1SFit×OILit+ β2Xit+ εit

Data

We employ an annual panel data set of 161 countries over 2002-2013. The choice of 161 countries is mainly based on the availability of data. These are the countries for which we could gather the data on all the variables used in the models estimated. The data on oil endowment, GDP/capita and population size is from the World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank. Data concerning democracy is taken from the POLITY IV data set and from Cheibub et al. data. Data related to the state failure is published by the Center for Systemic Peace. We refer to the Organization of Islamic Conference in order to know which countries can be considered as Muslim countries. Data concerning the level of corruption in a country is taken from the Quality of Government dataset.

To measure the level of terrorism in a country, we use the Global Terrorism Index from the data set constructed by Farzanegan, Krieger and Meierrieks (2016). They gathered data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which provides information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 to 2014. This database collects for each terrorist incident information related to the date and the location of the event, the weapons used, the nature of the target, the number of causalities, and (if identifiable) the group or individual responsible. It contains information on over 140 000 terrorist events. It is considered as the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events in the world[62]. Our dependent variable is the “Global Terrorism Index”. The score for each country for each year represent the sum of the number of incident, the number of fatalities, the number of injuries and the number of property damage. The score obtained is then converted to a scale of 0-10. Where 0 indicates no terrorism and 10 indicates the maximum level of terrorism observed. The high value indicates high level of terrorism and the vice versa.

Our two key independent variables are the oil endowment and the state fragility. The first one is measured by the oil rent in percentage of GDP. It is taken from the World Bank database. According to the World Bank definition, oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production. The second one is the “State Fragility Index”, also traditionally known as the “State Failure Index”: it rates each country according to its level of fragility in both effectiveness and legitimacy across four development dimensions: security, political, economic, and social. It is published by the Center for Systemic Peace. We use the variable called “SFI”, which is the sum of effectiveness and legitimacy fragility.

GDP per capita is measured at constant US dollars in 2005. Data on both GDP and population size perfectly cover our period of observation: 2002-2013. In order to measure the level of democracy, we use the variable POLITY 2 from the POLITY IV database which provides data for 186 countries starting from 1800.The scores ranges between -10 and 10 as follows: [-10, -6]: autocracy, [-5, 0]: closed anocracy, [1, 5]: open anocracy, [6, 9]: democracy, 10: full democracy. The value of 0 is given to the first regime type (autocracy), the value of 1 is given to the second regime type (closed anocracy), 2 to the third (open anocracy), 3 to the fourth (democracy) and 4 to the fifth (democracy). We construct a dummy variable for Muslim countries; it takes the value of 1 if the country is Muslim, o otherwise. The value of 1 is given to the country which is member of the “Organization of the Islamic Conference”[63]. To ensure the robustness of our results, we use a second measure for democracy which is the indicator constructed by Cheibub et al. They gathered data for 202 countries covering the period 1946-2008. We take the variable called “Democracy” which represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is democratic. The value of 0 is attributed if the country is a dictatorship.

In order to measure corruption level in a country, we use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. Data concerning this index is taken from the Quality of Government dataset. The CPI concentrates on corruption existing in the public sector and which can be defined as the misuse of public office for private benefit. The index is based on perceptions of the level of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. Values of the score range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)[64].

In order to measure the impact of oil endowment and state fragility on terrorism, we use panel data estimation as it can be considered as an efficient analytical method for analysis. After doing several econometric tests, we decided to choose the OLS estimator which provides robust results.

Results and discussion

Tables A2 shows the impact of oil rents on terrorism. The dependent variable is the Global Terrorism Index. The analysis shows that oil rents in percentage of GDP (used as proxy for oil endowment) exercises positive and significant impact on the Global Terrorism Index (used as a proxy for terrorism). Equation (1) is estimated with GDP/capita as a regressor. Equation (2) incorporates the population size. The inclusion of the population size as an independent variable in equation (2) significantly increases the explanatory power of the model from 0.04 to 0.33 and is therefore maintained as a regressor in all the following equations. Equation (3) incorporates a dummy variable for Muslim countries. The democracy variable is added as a regressor in equations (4) and (5). In equation (4) we used the POLITY IV measurement of democracy. However, in equation (5) we used Cheibub and al. indicator of democracy. The last two equations of table A2: equation (6) and (7) incorporate the Corruption Perception Index.

The coefficient of key interest is the oil rents in percentage of GDP. The estimated coefficients on oil rents in percentage of GDP are significant in all equations suggesting that oil endowment has a positive impact on the rise of terrorism. The coefficients on log GDP/capita are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in all equations suggesting that the rise in income generates the decrease of terrorism. However, the coefficients on log population size are positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all equations suggesting that the rise of population size generates the rise of terrorism. The coefficients on the dummy variable for Muslim countries are positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all equations (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). As for the democracy variable, we find that the coefficient is positive and highly significant at 1% level only in equations (4) and (6) when we use the POLITY IV data, but when we run the model with the other measurement of democracy: Cheibub et al. indicator, the coefficient in equation (5) becomes insignificant and the explanatory power of the model decreases. In equations (6) and (7), we introduce the corruption variable measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The variable GDP/ capita was removed because we noted that there is a strong and positive correlation (0.81) between this variable and the CPI variable. In both equations, the estimated coefficients on the corruption variable are negative and highly significant. So, a corrupt country can be much more vulnerable to terrorism. In equation (7), we just changed our measurement for democracy by using the Cheibub et al. indicator.

Now, we move to Table A3 which shows the impact of both oil rents and state fragility on terrorism. Because of the high correlation between State Fragility Index and log GDP/ capita (-0.85), we decided to remove from equations (8) and (9) the latter in order to avoid problem of multicollinearity. The inclusion of the SFI in equation (8) significantly enhances the explanatory power of our model, as we obtain the best R2.The estimated coefficients on the SFI are positive and highly significant at 1% level. This can be interpreted as follows: in equation (8) for example, when the State Fragility Index rises by 1 unit, the Global Terrorism Index will rise by 0.11 units. The estimated coefficients on the population size and Islam variable still have the same sign and effect as detailed earlier. In equation (9), we use the Cheibub et al. indicator. The impact of democracy becomes insignificant.

Tables A4 shows the results obtained after modifying our baseline model by introducing the interaction term between the State Fragility Index and the Oil Rents variable. Here, we aim to examine whether oil rents have an impact on the relationship between terrorism and state fragility. We use the same control variables as for the previous models. The regression implies a positive and significant impact of state fragility on the increase of terrorism through the coefficients of the interaction term which are positive and highly significant at 1% level in both estimations (10) and (11). Moreover, the coefficients those describe the relationship between terrorism index and state fragility, with an interaction effect, are lower comparing to the previous estimations. That is to say, state fragility increases terrorism in general, but this relationship is more likely to exist in the presence of oil resources.

Appendix

Table A1

Descriptive statistics

Source: Authors own calculation.

Table A2

Dependent variable: Global Terrorism Index: GTI

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. LOG POP= log population size. ISLAM= dummy variable for Muslim countries. DEMOC= the policy IV democracy variable. DEMOC1= the Cheibub et al. democracy indicator. CPI= Corruption Perception Index. CST=CONSTANT. NBR OBS= number of observations.

Table A3

Dependent variable: Global Terrorism Index: GTI

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. SFI= State Fragility Index. LOG POP= log population size. ISLAM= dummy variable for Muslim countries. DEMOC= the policy IV democracy variable. DEMOC1= the Cheibub et al. democracy indicator. CST=CONSTANT. NBR OBS= number of observations.

Table A4

Dependent variable: Global Terrorism Index: GTI

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. OIL RENT*SFI= Interaction term. LOG POP= log population size. ISLAM= dummy variable for Muslim countries. DEMOC= the policy IV democracy variable. DEMOC1= the Cheibub et al. democracy indicator. CPI= Corruption Perception Index CST=CONSTANT. NBR OBS= number of observations.

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  18. Conflict Armament Research Center (2014), Islamic State Weapons in Iraq and Syria Analysis of weapons and ammunition captured from Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, The Conflict Armament Research, September 2014, http://conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Weapons.pdf41
  19. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism
  20. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32002F0475
  21. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32002F0475
  22. Dean, Aimen, Edwina Thompson & Tom Keatinge (2013), Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime, Vol. 7, No 4.
  23. Gartenstein-Ross and T. Vessefi (2012), Perception of the ”Arab Spring” within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 831-848 11
  24. Donald Holbrook, Al-Qaeda’s Response to the Arab Spring, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.6 , Issue 6. pp4-21.
  25. Dyer, O. Kessler (2014), Terror in the Sinai, The Henry Jackson Society, 2014 http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/HJS-Terror-in-the-Sinai-Report-Colour-Web.pdf
  26. Esty, Gurr, Goldstone, Surko, and Unger(1995), Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report 1995
  27. FATF (2015), Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), FATF, fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html46
  28. Fawaz A. Gerges (2011) The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press, pp. 4 – 5
  29. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, N° 1.pp 75-90.
  30. Goldstone, Jack A., R. H. Bates, D. L. Epstein, T. R. Gurr, M. B. Lustik, M. G. Marshall, J. Ulfelder, and M. Woodward (2010), ‘‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.’’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54.pp190-208.
  31. Gurr, Ted Robert (2006). ‘‘Economic Factors.’’ In The Roots of Terrorism, edited by Louise Richardson, 85-102. New York: Routledge. Hippel, Karin (2002). ‘‘The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths.’’ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, N°1.pp 25-39.
  32. Helman, Gerald and Steven R. Ratner (1992), ‘‘Saving Failed States.’’ Foreign Policy, Vol. 89. pp 3-20
  33. A. Carter, S. Maher and P. R. Neumann (2014), Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, (ICSR 2014) http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf
  34. Krieger, Tim, and Daniel Meierrieks, (2011), What Causes Terrorism?, Public Choice Vol.147, Issue 1.pp 3-27.
  35. Lahoud, Nelly (2011), “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Reaction to Revolution in the Middle East”, CTC Sentinel 4:4
  36. Le Billon, Philippe (2001). The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography.Vol. 20, N° 5.pp 561-84.
  37. Lili, Euginio (2011), Revolts in the Arab world: is it bad news for Islamic terrorists?, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol.2, Issue 1. Pp
  38. Morell and B. Harlow (2015), The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism–From al Qa’ida to ISIS, Twelve Hachette Book Group; New York 2015 14 Libya PM Zeidan’s brief kidnap was ‘attempted coup’, BBC News 11 October 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24496357
  39. Sullivan (2014), Hezbollah in Syria, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report, April 2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf16
  40. Maximilian Robespierre (February 1794), quoted in Paul Wurth, La Répression International du Terrorisme, Lausanne : Impremerie la Concorde, 1941, p.12
  41. Mirjam E. Sorli, Nils Petter, GleditschHavard Strand, (2005), Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 No. 1.pp141-165
  42. National Oil Corporation (Libya), Statement of the National Oil Corporation and its subsidiaries on theft and vandalism and destruction, March, 4 2015 http://noc.ly/index.php/ar/new-2/845-23
  43. OPEC, Share of Worled crude oil reserves 2014, OPEC http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm22
  44. Osama Bin Laden (2011), ‘The Last Speech of the Martyr of Islam – as we see him – To the Muslim Ummah”, published by As-Sahab (19 May 2011), translated by the Global Islamic Media Front.
  45. P .Zalewski (2014) , “The Jihadists Want a Petro State of Their Own, Too“, Bloomberg Businessweek, bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-20/iraqs-isil-jihadists-want-an-oil-state-of-theirown-too
  46. PaiviLujala (2009), Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53,N°1.pp50-71
  47. Piazza, James A 2008, ‘‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism ?” , International Studies Quarterly 52:469-88.
  48. Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set version 2014.
  49. Hanlon (2012), Security Sector Reform in Tunisia a year after Jasmin Revolution, The United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR304.pdf13M.
  50. Barret (2014), Foreign Fighters in Syria, Sufan Research Group (The Sufan Group 2014), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf
  51. Rice, Susan E (2003). The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States. Brookings Policy Brief Series 115. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
  52. Richard J. Chasdi (2013), Forecasting the “Arab Spring” of 2011: Terrorist Incident Data from 2000-2010 Offered No Early Warning, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.7, N°2. pp 63-71. p.68
  53. Rotberg, Robert (2004), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  54. Ryan, Michael(2011) , What do the Uprisings in the Middle East mean for al-Qaeda?, Terrorism Monitor 9:11. p 6
  55. Schneider, Friedrich ;Meirrieks, Danniel and Bruck, Tilman (2014), The Economics of Counter terrorism: A Survey, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 00, No. 0.. pp. 1–27. p11
  56. Sheppard, Jerry Paul (1995), A Resource Dependence Approach to Organizational Failure, Social Science Research, Vol.24.pp28-62.
  57. SITE (2014) , AQAP Issues Formal Communiqué on Rocket Strike at Yemen LNG Plant inBalhaf, SITE Intelligence Group, December, 21 2014 https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/aqap-issues-formal-communique-on-rocket-strike-at-yemen-lng-plant-in-balhaf.html
  58. The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism signed at Cairo on 22 April 1998
  59. The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
  60. The United Nation Security Council Resolutions: S/RES/2170 (2014) of 15August 2014, and S/RES/2199 (2015) of 12 February 2015.
  61. The world Bank, Oil rents (% GTD), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?page=1&order=wbapi_data_value_2011%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-first&sort=asc
  62. UN General Assambly, A/RES/49/60 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 9 December 1994 . http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm
  63. UN, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), , http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_401.pdf
  64. Walter, Christin (2003), “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law”, Walter, Christin; Voneky, Silja; Roben, Volker; Schorkopf, Frank, Terrorism is a Challenge in National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty? Berlin/ Heidelberg, Springer 2003
  65. Enders and T. Sandler (2002). “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates.” International StudiesQuarterly 46(2): 145-164
  66. Seth Carus (2008), Defining Terrorism. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University. pp1-2

[1] PhD candidate at the University of Sousse and at the German-Arab Graduate School, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg. E-mail: amel.hammami@uni-hamburg.de amel.hammammi@gmail.com

[2] Master student at the High School of Economics and Commercial Sciences of Tunis, and guest student at the German-Arab Graduate School, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg. E-mail: monia.idoudi@uni-hamburg.de monia_idoudi@yahoo.fr

[3] In term of history, terrorism is not new or strange phenomenon for these countries. Syria was the Safe haven for armed groups fighting against US forces in Iraq. Egypt was the birthplace of the Muslim brotherhood and the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG). These groups have different extremism degrees, varied military capacities, different political influence and different operational intensities. Al-Qaeda in Yemen was a major player in the region for a long time along with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb controls the jihadist movement in northern Africa. This region witnessed the rise of other terrorist organizations such as “Jund Al-Khilafa”, which announced pledge allegiance to Abu Baker al-Baghdadi, as a Muslims Caliphate. The “Blood signatories movement” (Al-MouakiounBeddam Movement) is also active on the southern front of Algeria with Mali and Niger. Besides, the Ansar al-Sharia multi-branches were active in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Morocco.

In terms of geographical location, these countries are close to violent conflicts and civil wars and or terrorist bases. This geographical location protects and facilitates the movement of terrorists. For example, Syria and Egypt are on the borders of the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Libya’s southern desert still the crossing point of terrorists moving from Africa to East Asia, and on the northern Malian borders, which represents the deepness of Islamist terrorism in Africa. Tunisia is located on the east of Algeria, which has been the subject of a long bloody conflict with terrorism and still the training camp for terrorists.

[4]Bridget L. Coggins (2015), Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, Vol. 59(3) 455-483 .p 455

[5]Alex S. Wilner (2011), Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda’s African Affiliates, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Issue 3-4.pp50-62 p50

[6]Schneider, Friedrich; Meirrieks, Danniel and Bruck, Tilman (2014), The Economics of Counter terrorism: A Survey, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 00, No. 0.. pp. 1–27. p11

[7]Braniff, Bill and Moghadam, Assaf (2011), Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.5, Issue 2. Pp36-49

[8]Ibid.

[9]Fawaz A. Gerges (2011) The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press, pp. 4 – 5

[10]Lili, Euginio (2011), Revolts in the Arab world: is it bad news for Islamic terrorists?, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol.2, Issue 1. pp

[11] Ryan, Michael(2011) , What do the Uprisings in the Middle East mean for al-Qaeda?, Terrorism Monitor 9:11. p 6

[12]Lahoud, Nelly (2011), “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Reaction to Revolution in the Middle East”, CTC Sentinel 4:4

[13] Donald Holbrook, Al-Qaeda’s Response to the Arab Spring, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.6 , Issue 6. pp4-21.

[14]Lahoud, Nelly (2011), Op.Cit.

[15] Burke, Jason (2011) ,The 9/11 Wars, Allen Lane, London, p. 486

[16]Wilner (2011), Op.Cit.

[17] In his famous terrorist guide-book, Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Trough Which the Islamic Nation Will Pass (2004), Abu Baker Naji undervaluated the popular manifestations and considered them useless acts of the forbidden Democracy. In contrast, Oussama Ben Laden and Ayman Zawaheri considered the riots of 2011 a victory moment and brave acts of dignity.

[18]Ayman Al-Zawahiri (2011),‘The Noble Knight Dismounted’, distributed by As-Sahab, translated by the Global Islamic Media Front.

[19]Abu BakrNaji (2004),Op.Cit.

[20] Nelly Lahoud (2011), “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Reaction to Revolution in the Middle East”, CTC Sentinel 4:4.p 5.

[21] Osama Bin Laden (2011), ‘The Last Speech of the Martyr of Islam – as we see him – To the Muslim Ummah”, published by As-Sahab (19 May 2011), translated by the Global Islamic Media Front.

[22]Dean, Aimen, Edwina Thompson & Tom Keatinge (2013), Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime, Vol. 7, No 4

[23]Syria ranked 5 for 8.12 points, Yemen 8 for 7.31 points, Egypt 13 for 6.5 points, Libya 15 for 6.25 points, Tunisia ranked 46 for 3.29

[24] Goldstone, Jack A., R. H. Bates, D. L. Epstein, T. R. Gurr, M. B. Lustik, M. G. Marshall, J. Ulfelder, and M. Woodward (2010), ‘‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.’’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54.pp190-208.

[25]D.Gartenstein-Ross and T. Vessefi (2012), Perception of the ”Arab Spring” within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35.pp 831-848

[26]D. Gartenstein-Ross and T. Vessefi (2012), Perception of the ”Arab Spring” within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35.pp 831-848

[27]Alex S. Wilner (2011), Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda’s African Affiliates, Op.Cit.

[28] Alex S. Wilner. (2011)‘Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda’s African Affiliates’ in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Issues 3 – 4. p. 57.

[29] Rice, Susan E (2003). The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States. Brookings Policy Brief Series 115. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution

[30]Concerning the number of foreign fighters in Syria, Sufan Research Group released a study by Richard Barrett in June 2014. He noticed the existence of 12,000 foreign fighters in Syria at least coming from 81 countries, and most of them were joining ISIS group. He estimated that about 3,000 fighters among them were belonging to Western countries. R. Barret (2014), Foreign Fighters in Syria, Sufan Research Group (The Sufan Group 2014), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf

Also, according to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), the distribution of foreign fighters in Syria is: 412 French citizens, about 296 of Belgium and 240from Germany. “The United Kingdom ranked first in our sample with 17.9 per cent of the total, followed by France (11.6 per cent), then Germany (11.1 per cent), Sweden (10 per cent), Belgium (8.9 per cent), and the Netherlands (6.3 per cent). Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) comprised 9.6 per cent of the sample, while non-European Westerners (Australians, Canadians, and U.S. Americans) accounted for 5.3 per cent. Nearly 19 per cent were coded as unknown”. J. A. Carter, S. Maher and P. R. Neumann (2014), Green birds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, (ICSR 2014) http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf

[31] E. Dyer and O. Kessler (2014), Terror in the Sinai, the Henry Jackson Society. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/HJS-Terror-in-the-Sinai-Report-Colour-Web.pdf

[32] Q. Hanlon (2012), Security Sector Reform in Tunisia a year after the Jasmine Revolution, The United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR304.pdf

[33]M. Morell and B. Harlow (2015), The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism–From al Qa’ida to ISIS, Twelve Hachette Book Group; New York 2015

[34] A. S. Wilner (2011), Opportunity Cost or Cost Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda’s African Affiliates, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 5, Issues 3-4, September, p.57

[35]Bridget L. Coggins (2015), Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, Vol. 59(3) 455-483 .p 455

[36] Piazza, James A 2008 ‘‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?’’ International Studies Quarterly 52:469-88.

[37]Ibid.

[38] Bridget L. Coggins (2015), Op.Cit.

[39]Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, N° 1.pp 75-90.

[40]Mirjam E. Sorli, Nils Petter, GleditschHavard Strand, (2005) Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49 No. 1. pp. 141-165

[41] Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (2002), on the incidence of civil war in Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, n°1.pp 13-28. Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography, Vol. 20, N° 5.pp 561-84.

[42]Paivi Lujala (2009), Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53,N°1.pp50-71

[43]Sheppard, Jerry Paul(1995), A Resource Dependence Approach to Organizational Failure, Social Science Research, Vol.24.pp28-62.

[44]Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (2006).The political economy of secession. In Negotiating self determination, edited by Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt, 37-59. Lanham MD: Lexington Books.

[45]Beblawi, Hazem, and Giacomo Luiciani, (1987).The rentier state. New York: Croom Helm.

[46]Abulof, Uriel (2015), “Can’t buy me legitimacy”: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes. Journal of International Relations and Development

[47]Paivi Lujala (2009), Op.Cit.

[48]Paivi Lujala (2009), Op.Cit.

[49] Le Billon, Philippe (2001). The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography.Vol.20, n° 5.pp 561-84.

[50] The United Nation Security Council Resolutions: S/RES/2170 (2014) of 15August 2014, and S/RES/2199 (2015) of 12 February 2015.

[51] The assumption is that oil and oil products smuggling activities have increased since 2011 targeting all jurisdictions with neighboring territories where ISIL operates, but that the magnitude of such activities is impossible to assess. (…) ISIL takes advantage of the resources in this domain. According to several delegations, ISIL has been engaging in energy-related commerce with the Syrian regime, despite claiming otherwise. FATF (2015), Financing of the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), FATF, www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html

[52]The Conflict Armament Research Centre published a report about the weapons arsenal of IS. It proved that it has the latest types of sophisticated weapons, including large quantities confiscated by the NATO. The report confirms that ISIS had used these arms in the battles, which continued more than four months in the Syrian Kurdish city of Ain Arab (Kubani).The report indicates that many of ISIS weapons that were used in Kobanî battles were coming from Sudan. Other arms in the possession of ISIS were sent from the governments of neighbouring countries to the Syrian opposition, but they felt in the hands of IS fighters. According to this report, the weapons arsenal of ISIS includes anti-tank missiles, Shoulder-fired missile, Surface-to-air missile and automatic rifles. The report disclosed that a large number of weapons used by IS fighters were Western-industry, and some of them are used by NATO, including the armoured vehicles used by the elite forces. The Islamic State’s Weapons in Iraq and Syria Analysis of weapons and ammunition captured from Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, The Conflict Armament Research, September 2014, http://conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Weapons.pdf

[53]OPEC, Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, May 2014 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm

[54] The world Bank, Oil rents (% GTD), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?page=1&order=wbapi_data_value_2011%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-first&sort=asc

[55]The Syrian Economic Task Force prepared maps and graphs in February 2015 described that the Islamic State organization controls 95 percent of the Syrian oil fields. http://syrianeconomic.org/en/

[56] OPEC, the Share of World crude oil reserves 2014, OPEC http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm

[57] The world Bank, The Oil Rents (% of GDP) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?page=1&order=wbapi_data_value_2011%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-first&sort=asc

[58]Paivi Lujala (2009), Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict Paivi Lujala. Op.Cit. p56

[59] On March 4, 2015 the National Oil Corporation of Libya declared the force majeure situation on 11 oil fields in the country after being dominated by militias. These fields are Almabruk, Bahi, Dahra, Jufrah, Etbista, Ghana, Alnaka, Alsamah, Albaydha, Alwaha and Addufa with all cites annexed to these fields. The Oil Corporation declared in a statement that the security situation in some petrol fields is terrible which will lead to a complete inability of the fiscal revenue of the state and direct effects on people’s lives like the discontinuity of the electricity due to the suspension of gas supplies and liquid fuel and many other negative effects, that´s why it is necessary to provide the protection of these oil fields from vandalism and destruction. In this case, since December 2014 “Fajer Libya” Militia extend its control on these areas through “the Sunrise Operation to liberate the oil fields“. Equally, the militants of the Islamic State took control of the Bahi and Mabruk oil field station. As well as, the Oil ports in the regions of Sidra and RasLanuf and Bregawere also controlled by armed groups. National Oil Corporation – Statement of the National Oil Corporation and its subsidiaries on theft and vandalism and destruction, March, 4 2015 http://noc.ly/index.php/ar/new-2/845-

[60]The world Bank, Oil rents (% GTD),Op.Cit.

[61]Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombing of Balhaf port in 21 December 2014. It declared that their fighters attacked the LNG Corporation with two Katyusha missiles. In a commitment, Al-Qaeda presented this attack as a victory for our Muslim brothers against the global crusade. AQAP Issues Formal Communiqué on Rocket Strike at Yemen LNG Plant in Balhaf, SITE Intelligence Group, December, 21 2014https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/aqap-issues-formal-communique-on-rocket-strike-at-yemen-lng-plant-in-balhaf.html

[62] See https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/

[63] The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in the appendix Table A1.

[64] Definition is taken from the Quality of Government code book.